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GROKSTER AND BEYOND
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a Friday night and you are meeting your friends at a bar to relax and
celebrate the beginning of the weekend. You arrive at your destination and
notice that a local band is performing tonight. "Great," you think to yourself,
"I love live music." You order a drink and the band starts to play a familiar
song, something you have heard on the radio dozens of times. This is a
common scene, one that does not seem to involve any illegal activity. However,
by performing that one song, the band has engaged in copyright infringement
and they are not the only ones responsible. On July 13, 2010, the United States
District Court for the Central District of Illinois addressed just such a situation,
ruling that the owners and operators of Goodfellas Pub & Pizza (Goodfellas)
were vicariously liable for thirteen counts of copyright infringement.'
Goodfellas is a restaurant located in Pekin, Illinois that often hires local
bands to perform.2 On three separate occasions, Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI),
dispatched investigators to Goodfellas to determine specifically what music was
being played.' During the course of their investigation, BMI discovered the
bands hired by Goodfellas were playing copyrighted works without
authorization, including such popular songs as "Billie Jean," 4 "I Want You to
Want Me,"5 and "I Wanna Dance With Somebody Who Loves Me."6 On May
11, 2009, BMI filed suit for copyright infringement, seeking a permanent
injunction against Goodfellas in addition to statutory damages and costs and
attorney's fees.7
The court's decision is the result of the steady progression of the law
regarding copyright infringement, representing dozens of decisions spanning
nearly one hundred years. The purpose of this Note is to discuss the
progression of vicarious liability and contributory copyright infringement and
their impact on a frequently neglected but quintessential aspect of music: the
live performance. Specifically, this Note will examine the Grokster line of case
law and assess its effect on more basic forms of musical copyright infringement.
While on the surface MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster8 appears to be primarily
applicable to new and expanding technologies, the court's holding concerning
the two principal doctrines of secondary liability-vicarious liability and
1 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CDZ, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 930, 937 (C.D. Ill. 2010).
2 Id. at 932.
3 Id. at 933.
4 Id. at 932.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 933.
8 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
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contributory infringement-has definite ramifications for copyright
infringement during live performances. Part II will examine the historical
development of the doctrines of vicarious liability and contributory liability with
respect to copyright infringement. Part III will examine Grokster and the impact
it had upon the development of the two primary doctrines of secondary liability
in the post-Grokster world of copyright infringement. Part III will also examine
the relevancy of the post-Grokster rules to the potential liability of the owners
and operators of small music venues by applying the rules to the factual
situation set forth in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CDZ, Inc. Finally, Part III will
examine the methods of prevention available to the owners and operators of
small music venues in order to demonstrate the most effective means of
escaping liability.
II. BACKGROUND
A. COPYRIGHT ACT
The United States' Copyright Act, which establishes rights for authors and
creators, is codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 122.9 The United States has had a
copyright statute on record for much of our nation's history, with the first such
statute appearing in 1790.10 The 1790 Act protected against the copying of
certain printed materials without permission." Congress extended protection
to non-dramatic public performances in 1831;12 however, the statute still
permitted dramatic public performances without requiring authorization.' 3 The
Act was again amended in 1897,14 this time to include dramatic public
performances and musical performances, which were not included within the
scope of the amendment. 5 Musical works were finally brought within the
purview of the Act in 1909 when Congress replaced the Act with the 1909
Copyright Act.16 The 1909 Act required a plaintiff to prove three elements to
sustain a claim for copyright infringement: (1) the infringer must have
performed the copyrighted work, (2) in public, and (3) for profit. 7 The
9 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-122.
10 Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790); see also Julie B. Raines, The Fairness in Music
licensing Act: The Tavern Bill Casts a Shadow, 20 HASTINGS CoMM. & ENT. L.J. 169, 174 (1997).
11 Raines, supra note 10, at 174; Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790).
12 Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831).
13 Id.
"4 Copyright Act of 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481 (1897).
15 Id
'16 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
17 Id
176 [Vol. 19:173
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Copyright Act of 1976,18 which took effect on January 1, 1978, replaced the
Copyright Act of 1909 and it, along with numerous amendments, represents the
current codification of American copyright law.'9
Section 106 of the Copyright Act sets forth the exclusive rights for which
the Act provides protection.20 Specifically, the Act gives the copyright holder
the exclusive right "in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly." 21 Performing a work publicly is
further defined as performing the copyrighted work "at a place open to the
public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered. . . ."2 An
individual who violates this right is subject to suit for copyright infringement.23
In order to sustain a prima facie claim for copyright infringement, the
plaintiff must prove: (1) the infringer performed a copyrighted work in public
without the permission of the copyright holder, and (2) the defendant does not
fall within any of the exemptions included within the statute itself.24 The Act
includes several exceptions which relieve the infringer from liability and are
codified at 17 U.S.C. 5 110.2s These exceptions include the use of copyrighted
works for educational purposes, the use of certain copyrighted works for
religious worship, and the use of copyrighted works whereby the infringer does
not directly or indirectly profit from the use.26 Notably, small businesses are
also given an exemption.27 In order to qualify for the exemption, a small
business must "(1) be a small commercial establishment; (2) not make a 'direct
charge' to hear the music; (3) employ a 'single receiving apparatus of a kind
18 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (current version at 17 U.S.C.
i 101-122).
19 ROBERT A. GORMAN, COPYRIGHT LAw 3 (2d ed. 2006).
20 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006); 7 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
app. 2, at ch. 1 § 106 (2011).
21 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2006).
2 Id 101.
23 Id. 501.
24 Id. 501(a); Peggy H. Luh, Pay or Don't Play: Background Music and the Small Business Exemption
of Copyrght Law, 16 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 711, 713 (1996); see also Mob Music Publ'g v. Zanzibar on
the Waterfront, LLC, 698 F. Supp. 2d 197, 202 (D.D.C. 2010) (requiring plaintiff prove "(1)
originality and authorship of the compositions involved; (2) compliance with formalities required
to secure a copyright; (3) plaintiffs ownership of the copyright; and (4) defendant's public
performance of the compositions."); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CDZ, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 930,
934 (C.D. Ill. 2010) ("A plaintiff claiming copyright infringement must establish two elements: 1)
ownership of a valid copyright, and 2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are
original.").
25 17 U.S.C. 5 110 (2006).
26 Id. § 110(1), (3)-(4).
27 U.S.C. 5 110(5) (2006); Luh, supra note 24, at 715.
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commonly used in private homes;' and finally, (4) 'the performances must not
be further transmitted to the public.' "28 Furthermore, a copyright infringement
action must be filed no more than three years after the accrual of the claim.29
B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
While the Copyright Act does not explicitly extend liability to secondary
infringers, the House Report indicates the legislators intended the Act to extend
to individuals other than the primary infringer:
A well established principle of copyright law is that a person who
violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner is an
infringer, including persons who can be considered related or
vicarious infringers .... The Committee has decided that no
justification exists for changing existing law, and causing a
significant erosion of the public performance right.30
The House of Representatives opined that to be held secondarily liable for
infringement, the defendant had to "actively operate or supervise the operation
of the place wherein the performances occur, or control the content of the
infringing program, and expect commercial gain from the operation and either
direct or indirect benefit from the infringing performance." 31
1. The Historical Development of Vicarious Liability. In 1927, the Eastern
District of Tennessee recognized the applicability of secondary liability to
copyright infringement law suits through the doctrine of respondeat superior.32
There, the court held the owners and operators of a movie theatre in Lenoir
City, Tennessee liable for copyright infringement resulting from their employee
playing a borrowed player piano roll during a showing of a motion picture.33
The court rejected the defendants' contention that they could not be held liable
for copyright infringement because they did not intend for any infringement to
occur, stating that "the lack of intention does not affect the fact of liability. The
n 17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (2006); Luh, supra note 24, at 719.
29 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2006).
30 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, § 501, at 159-60 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674.
See also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Peppermint Club, Inc., Nos. C 83-694, C 84-7535, 1985 WL
6141, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 16, 1985) (discussing their part of the legislative history of the
Copyright Act of 1976 as a basis for liability of a music club for allowing performance of
plaintiff's copyrighted work after the expiration of the license).
31 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, § 501, at 159-60.
32 See M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F.2d 412 (E.D. Tenn. 1927).
33 Id. at 413.
178 [Vol. 19:173
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result, and not the intention, determines the question of infringement." 34 The
court further held that the employer is liable for any wrongful acts committed
by his employee in the course of his employment and that such was applicable
despite an order from the employer to the employee to the contrary.35
In Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., the Seventh Circuit
held that the owners and operators of a dance hall were still subject to liability
for copyright infringement even though the primary infringer, an orchestra, was
an independent contractor. 36 The court reasoned Dreamland Ball Room should
be held liable because the orchestra in question performed the copyrighted
works for the profit of Dreamland Ball Room, thus meeting the standard for
copyright infringement. 37
In 1963, the Second Circuit announced its opinion in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.
v. H.L Green Co. 38 In that case, H.L. Green Co. entered into a licensing
agreement with Jalen Amusement Company to operate the phonograph record
department in twenty-three of H.L. Green's stores.39 The licensing agreement
in question provided H.L. Green with ten to twelve percent of the profits
accrued from record sales." In addition, H.L. Green retained the power to fire
employees for misconduct.4' Given these facts, the court held H.L. Green
liable for copyright infringement stemming from Jalen's production of bootleg
records. 42 Green certainly satisfied one prong of the test for vicarious liability
by profiting from the sale of the bootleg records.43 Additionally, the court
found that he satisfied the second prong of its test for vicarious liability.44
Specifically, H.L. Green was liable because he possessed a supervisory right
over Jalen:
[w]hen the right and ability to supervise coalesce[d] with an
obvious and direct financial interest in the exploitation of
copyrighted materials - even in the absence of actual knowledge
that the copyright monopoly [was] being impaired - the
3 Id. at 414.
35 Id.
36 Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929).
37 Id.
38 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963).
39 Id. at 306.
40 Id.
41 Id
42 Id. at 308.
43 Id. at 307.
44 Id.
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purposes of copyright law [would] be best effectuated by the
imposition of liability upon the beneficiary of that exploitation. 45
Because Green had the power to supervise and control Jalen's conduct, he
was in the best position to prevent Jalen from infringing upon copyrights by
making the various bootleg records.46
In 1971, the Second Circuit took the ruling in Shapiro a step further. The
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) sued
Columbia Artists Management, Inc. (CAMI) for copyright infringement when
artists managed by CAMI performed copyrighted works belonging to Gershwin
Publishing Company during a community concert.47 The court held that the
rule regarding the right and ability to supervise and control the primary
infringers' performance had been satisfied despite an inability to exercise direct
control over the primary infringers. 48 As the court stated, "even in the absence
of an employer-employee relationship one may be vicariously liable if he has the
right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial
interest in such activities."49
2. Elements of Vicarious Liabilio. Vicarious liability for copyright
infringement has two requirements: (1) the defendant must possess the right
and ability to supervise the infringement, and (2) the defendant must gain
financially from the infringement.50 Of course, it should be noted that one
cannot be held vicariously liable for copyright infringement without an act of
direct infringement.5 Furthermore, the two prongs of the test should be
analyzed together, using the "totality of the relationship" approach.52 In
employing this approach, a court should look at all aspects of the relationship
45 Id. (citations omitted).
46 Id. at 308.
47 Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1160 (2d Cir. 1971).
48 Id. at 1163.
49 Id. at 1162.
5o RONALD S. ROSEN, MUSIC AND COPYRIGHT 550 (2008); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005) (one "infringes vicariously by profiting
from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it"); Gershwin Publ'g
Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cit. 1971) ("[Olne may be
vicariously liable if he has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has a
direct financial interest in such activities."); MOB Music Publ'g v. Zanzibar on the Waterfront,
L.L.C., 698 F. Supp. 2d 197, 206 (D.D.C. 2010) ("It is well established that an individual may be
held vicariously liable for copyright infringement if he (i) has the 'right and ability' to supervise
the infringing activity and (ii) has a 'direct financial interest' in such activities.").
51 ROSEN, supra note 50, at 551; see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,
1013 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Secondary liability for copyright infringement does not exist in the
absence of direct infringement by a third party.").
52 6 WILIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 21:66 (2010).
[Vol. 19:173180
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between the direct infringer and the vicariously liable party pertinent to the
direct infringement.53
a. Right and Ability to Supenrise and Control the Infnnging Conduct. The first
prong of the test for vicarious copyright infringement involves the right and
ability to supervise and control the infringing conduct. There are two
predominant views regarding this element--one requiring actual control and
the other requiring only legal control.54 The actual control view is narrower,
requiring evidence of a continuous connection between the two parties in terms
of the infringing activity.55 One cannot be held liable under the actual control
standard if one merely had the right to stop the infringing activity, "[t]hus, an
actual-control standard does not extend liability to a defendant who could not
take meaningful steps to prevent infringement."5 6  Therefore, the mere
possibility of preventing infringement is not sufficient to establish actual control
absent evidence that defendants exercised any degree of control over the direct
infringers.57 Some courts have even gone a step further, requiring that there be
evidence of a previous instance of prior control over the particular infringing
activity.58
The costs of policing the infringing conduct also play a role in determining
whether a court will find that the defendant did in fact exercise actual control
over the infringing conduct.59 In Artists Music, Inc. v. Reed Publising, Inc., the
organizers of a trade show were not held liable for unauthorized renditions of
copyrighted works because the cost of policing potential copyright infringement
would have been prohibitive.60
The broader view is the legal control standard.61 The legal control standard
extends liability to anyone who possessed the ability to police the infringing
conduct.62 Thus, the first prong of the test for vicarious copyright infringement
is satisfied "[w]hether or not the defendant exerted actual control over the
53 Id.
54 Charles S. Wright, Actual Versus Legal Controk Reading Vicarious Liabilip for Copyight
Infringement into the Digital Millennium CopyrightAct of 1998,75 WASH. L. REv. 1005, 1012 (2000).
ss Id. at 1013.
56 Id.
57 Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding defendants not
to be vicariously liable for copyright infringement despite satisfying the direct financial benefit
prong because of a dearth of evidence indicating defendants exercised any control).
58 Banff Ltd. v. Ltd., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
59 Wright, supra note 54, at 1014.
60 Nos. 93 CIV. 3428 GFK), 73163, 1994 WL 191643, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 1994).
61 Wright, supra note 54, at 1016.
62 Id See also Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159, 1163
(2d Cir. 1971) (holding defendant concert organizer vicariously liable for copyright infringement
because it was "in a position to police the infringing conduct of its artists").
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musicians and their selections .... The key factor is whether the defendant
controlled or had the rigbt and ability to control the infringing activity."63
b. Direct Financial Beneit. The second prong of the test for vicarious
copyright infringement involves the receipt of a direct financial benefit. Shapiro,
the leading case on vicarious liability for copyright infringement, required "an
obvious and direct financial interest." 64 There, the court found this prong to be
satisfied by H.L. Green's collection of ten to twelve percent of Jalen's bootleg
record sales.65
Courts have increasingly promulgated looser standards, imposing vicarious
liability upon a lesser showing of financial benefit.66 The United States House
of Representatives Judiciary Committee found that the financial benefit
requirement could be satisfied by either a direct or indirect benefit.67 One such
example of an indirect financial benefit is the "draw theory" developed by the
Ninth Circuit in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Chergy Auction, Inc.68 There, the court found
the financial benefit prong could be satisfied by the fact that the sale of
infringing works drew customers to the Cherry Auction swap meet.69 Once the
customers had been drawn into the swap meet, Cherry Auction "reap[ed]
substantial financial benefits from admission fees, concession stand sales and
parking fees." 70
The "draw theory" does not require the defendant to derive a substantial
portion of its income from infringing activity.71 However, the financial benefit
received has to be causally connected to the infringing material.72  The
63 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Peppermint Club, Inc., Nos. C83-694, C84-7535, 1985 WL 6141, at
*5 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 16, 1985) (emphasis in original). See also MOB Music Publ'g v. Zanzibar on
the Waterfront, LLC, 698 F. Supp. 2d 197, 206-07 (D.D.C. 2010) (extending liability to a
defendant who had the right to supervise the infringing conduct through song selection); Warner
Bros., Inc. v. Lobster Pot, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 478, 483 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (stating active
supervision is not required as long as the defendant has "the 'right and ability' to supervise the
infringing activities"); Major Bob Music, v. Stubbs, 851 F. Supp. 475, 480 (S.D. Ga. 1994)
(holding defendant bar-owner vicariously liable because she had "the right and ability to control
the activities at her establishment").
64 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green, Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).
65 Id. at 308.
66 6 PATRY, supra note 52, $ 21:68 (2010).
67 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, § 501, at 159-60 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659.
68 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cit. 1996); 6 PATRY, supra note 52,§ 21:68.
69 Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 263.
70 Id
71 See 6 PATRY, supra note 52, § 21:68 (citing Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th
Cit. 2004)).
72 Id
182 [Vol. 19:173
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infringing products also must have been the chief reason why the customers
came to the defendant's location.73
C. CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT
1. The Historical Development of Contributoy Infringement. In 1911, the Supreme
Court set forth its ruling in what has become one of the most famous early
contributory infringement cases. 74 In Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., the defendant
produced an unauthorized reproduction of Ben Hur, the novel by General Lew
Wallace.75 The defendant, however, was not sued for the unauthorized
reproduction itself, but rather for the subsequent performances of the
unauthorized reproduction.76 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing for the
Court, held that the defendant had contributed to the infringement and stated
that "[t]he defendant not only expected but invoked by advertisement the use
of its films for dramatic reproduction of the story."77
The most influential contributory infringement case to date is Gershwin
Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc.78 in that case, ASCAP brought
a copyright infringement action against Columbia Artists Management, Inc. for
the unauthorized performances of musical pieces-including "Bess, You Is My
Woman Now"-at a concert by artists managed by Columbia Artists
Management, Inc.79 Although the court ultimately held Columbia Artists
Management vicariously liable for copyright infringement, it famously set forth
the quintessential test for contributory copyright infringement: "one who, with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to
the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory'
infringer."o
2. Elements of Contributoy Infringement. Contributory copyright infringement
has two elements: (1) the defendant must possess knowledge of the direct
infringement and (2) the defendant must have materially contributed to the
infringement.8 ' The test for contributory infringement is similar to that of
73 Id.
74 Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
75 Id. at 60.
76 Id. at 55; 6 PATRY, supra note 52, § 21:45 (2010).
n Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1911).
78 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
79 Gershwin Publg 443 F.2d at 1160.
8 Id. at 1162.
81 Id.; see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005)
("One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement.");
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001) (defining contributory
copyright infringement according to the Gershwin standard); Matthew Bender & Co. v. West
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vicarious copyright infringement in two ways. First, like vicarious copyright
infringement, one cannot be found contributorily liable unless there is also an
instance of direct infringement.82 Second, the two prongs of the test cannot be
analyzed separately.83 Rather, a court must analyze the knowledge requirement
in tandem with the material contribution requirement in order to fully ascertain
whether a defendant has contributorily infringed upon another's copyright.8"
a. Knowledge of the Direct Infringement. The first prong of the test for
contributory copyright infringement requires that the defendant possess
knowledge of the direct infringement. This prong can be satisfied by either
constructive or actual knowledge, depending upon the requirements of the
particular court.85 The requirement of only constructive knowledge resulted
from the Supreme Court's ruling in Sony Corp. ofAmerica v. Universal City Studios,
Inc.86 Universal sued Sony for copyright infringement stemming from the use
of one of their products-specifically a home videotape recorder.87 Purchasers
of these home videotape recorders used the devices to record broadcasts of
programs copyrighted by Universal Studios.88 Justice Stevens's majority
opinion stated that for liability to be imposed, Sony must have sold equipment
with "constructive knowledge of the fact that their customers may use that
equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted material."89 Sony was
ultimately not held contributorily liable for copyright infringement because their
product was capable of "substantial noninfringing uses."90
The Seventh Circuit has partially rejected the Supreme Court's holding in
Sony and instead has extended liability for willful blindness, which is essentially a
form of constructive knowledge.9' In the case of In re Aimster Copynight
Utigation, the holders of certain copyrighted musical works sued Aimster, an
internet service that allowed individuals to "swap" said copyrighted works. 92
Aimster argued that it could not be found contributorily liable because the site's
encryption feature prevented Aimster from knowing which songs were being
Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding contributory liability where either "(i)
personal conduct that encourages or assists the infringement; and (ii) provision of machinery or
goods that facilitate the infringement" exists).
82 6 PATRY, supra note 52, S 21:46.
83 Id. § 21:47.
84 Id.
8 Id.
8 Id; Sony, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
87 464 U.S. at 419-20.
88 Id. at 420.
89 Id. at 439.
90 Id. at 456.
91 6 PATRY, supra note 52, § 21:47.
92 In rr Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 644 (7th Cir. 2003).
184 [Vol. 19:173
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copied by their users.93 Judge Posner, writing for the majority, rejected
Aimster's willful blindness argument and held that "[o]ur point is only that a
service provider that would otherwise be a contributory infringer does not
obtain immunity by using encryption to shield itself from actual knowledge of
the unlawful purposes for which the service is being used." 94
Other courts have found liability premised upon actual knowledge of
specific acts of copyright infringement.95 For example, in A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc., the plaintiff record company sued Napster for the "reproduction
and distribution of copyrighted works" by the company's users.96 The Ninth
Circuit declined to hold Napster liable for contributory copyright infringement
merely because its product was not capable of substantial non-infringing uses
unlike the VCR in Sony.97 Rather, the court stated that "absent any specific
information which identifies infringing activity, a computer system operator
cannot be liable for contributory infringement merely because the structure of
the system allows for the exchange of copyrighted material." 98 Ultimately,
despite failing to impose liability, the court found that Napster met the requisite
knowledge requirement because it had actual knowledge of specific instances of
infringement and had the ability to block the providers of the infringing
articles.99
b. Material Contribution to the Direct Infringement. The second prong of the
test for contributory copyright infringement requires that the defendant
materially contributed to the direct act of infringement. In determining whether
the defendant is liable for contributory infringement, a court will look at the
role played by the defendant in the infringing activity.100 In Livnat v. Lavi, a
case concerning liability for the publication of a photographer's nude
photographs, the district court aptly described the material contribution
requirement of the test, stating that "[i]n order for liability to be imposed, the
alleged contributory infringer must make more than a 'mere quantitative
contribution' to the primary infringement... . Participation in the infringement
must be substantial."101
9 Id. at 650.
9 Id. at 650-51.
95 Mark Bartholomew, Copynght, Trademark and Seconday Liability After Grokster, 32 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 445, 455 (2009), UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott, 300 F. Supp. 2d, 993, 998-99 (E.D.
Cal. 2004); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 488 (1964).
96 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001).
9 Id. at 1021.
98 Id.
9 Id. at 1021-22.
1oo 6 PATRY, supra note 52, § 21:48.
101 Livnat v. Lavi, No. 96 CIV. 4967 (RWS), 1998 WL 43221, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1993).
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There are two ways to satisfy the material contribution prong.102 First,
material contribution can be achieved through active causation, also known as
inducement. 03 In Jalbert v. Grautski, the court found that this prong of the
contributory infringement test required active rather than passive involvement,
holding that "mere knowledge, even knowledge based on willful blindness, is
not sufficient to show contributory infringement. Proof of contributory
infringement also requires proof that a person induced, caused or materially
contributed to the infringing conduct of another."104 Specifically, the court
found a printing company not to be contributorily liable for copyright
infringement where one of its employees had taken a few copies of a print and
distributed them to other individuals. 05 The owner of the print shop was
found not to have actively contributed to the directly infringing activity. 06
The second way of satisfying the material contribution requirement is
through providing the means of infringement, often referred to as the "site and
facilities" standard.107 The most well-known example of this method is found
in Fonotisa.08  As discussed above, the court in Fonodisa found that Cherry
Auction had materially contributed to the direct infringement by one of its
vendors through the "provision of space, utilities, parking, advertising,
plumbing, and customers."' 09 Cherry Auction argued that its involvement in
the direct infringement was passive at best.10 The court rejected this argument,
instead stating that "Cherry Auction actively str[ove] to provide the
environment and the market for the counterfeit recording sales to thrive. Its
participation in the sales cannot be termed 'passive,' as Cherry Auction would
prefer.""'
Another example of this interpretation of the material contribution prong is
found in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Aveco, Inc.112  Plaintiff film producers
distributed copies of their motion pictures on videotapes.113 Defendant Aveco
owned and operated an establishment which rented such videotapes for viewing
in either one of its private rooms or the individual's home.114 Plaintiff
102 6 PATRY, supra note 52, § 21:48.
103 Id
104 Jalbert v. Grautski, 554 F. Supp. 2d 57, 72 (D. Mass. 2008).
105 Id. at 63-67.
106 Id. at 72.
107 6 PATRY, supra note 52, § 21:48.
108 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cit. 1996).
109 Id
110 Id
M1 Id
112 Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986).
113 Id at 61.
114 Id
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producers sued Aveco for copyright infringement, alleging that Aveco had
authorized the public performances of their films. 15 The court found Aveco
contributorily liable for copyright infringement, basing its finding on the fact
that "Aveco encourages the public to make use of its facilities for the purpose
of viewing such tapes and makes available its rooms and equipment to
customers who bring cassettes with them."" 6
III. ANALYSIS
A. GROKSTER'S IMPACT
1. The Supreme Court's Holding in Grokster. In 2005, the Supreme Court
rendered a decision that would seriously impact secondary liability for copyright
infringement. On June 27, the Court issued its opinion in Metro-Goldwn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Gmkster, Ltd." Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM), in addition to
other copyright holders, sued defendants Grokster and StreamCast for
secondary copyright infringement, claiming that "they knowingly and
intentionally distributed their software to enable users to reproduce and
distribute the copyrighted works in violation of the Copyright Act."118
Grokster and StreamCast provided free computer software that enabled users
to share computer files through peer-to-peer networks." 9 The software allowed
users to download files directly from the computers of other users.120
Specifically, a user's request went to a "supemode computer," which indexed
the available files.121 Once the requested file had been located, its location was
given to the requester and he or she had the option to directly download the file
from the computer possessing it.122 If the requesting user chose to download
the file, it was copied and placed in a shared folder on the individual's
computer.123 Other users of the software were then able to download the file
from the original requesting user as well.124
115 Id at 61-62.
116 Id. at 62 n.3. See alo H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), nprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5674 (expressing that a "person who lawfully acquires an authorized copy of a motion
picture would be an infringer if he or she engages in the business of renting it to others for
purposes of unauthorized public performance").
117 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
11s Id. at 920-21.
119 Id. at 919-20.
120 Id. at 921-22.
121 Id
122 Id
123 Id. at 921.
124 Id.
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MGM provided the Court with empirical evidence indicating that close
to 90% of the downloadable files on the system in question were copyrighted
works.125 Furthermore, Grokster and StreamCast conceded that they were
aware that many users used their software to download infringing works.126
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, summarized the factual basis, stating
that "[t]he record is replete with evidence that from the moment Grokster and
StreamCast began to distribute their free software, each one clearly voiced the
objective that recipients use it to download copyrighted works, and each took
active steps to encourage infringement."127
In prior proceedings the district court found direct copyright infringement
on behalf of the individuals who downloaded files using the two companies'
software.128 However, the court granted summary judgment in favor of
Grokster and StreamCast on the issue of contributory infringement by third-
party users because it found that they did not materially contribute, through
either active or substantial involvement, to the act of direct infringement.129
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling because MGM had not
satisfied either prong of the contributory infringement analysis.130 The court
required actual knowledge of specific infringing acts for the imposition of
liability where the product in question was also capable of substantial non-
infringing uses.' 3' The court further found the material contribution element to
be lacking because defendants' contributions were only incidental to the direct
activity and therefore could not constitute a substantial contribution.132
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.133 In delivering its decision, the
Court adopted the rule of inducement from patent law.134 The rule of
inducement places liability upon "one who distributes a device with the object
of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or
other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, [making that person] liable
for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties."135 The Court further
stated that this rule required the secondary infringer to engage in purposeful
125 Id. at 922.
126 Id. at 923.
127 Id. at 923-24.
128 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1035 (C.D.
Cal. 2003).
129 Id. at 1043.
130 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004).
131 Id. at 1162.
132 Id
133 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928 (2005).
134 Id. at 936 n.11.
135 Id. at 936-37.
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and blameworthy conduct.136 Grokster and StreamCast intentionally injected
themselves into a market whose participants were infamous for engaging in
copyright infringement, yet they purposely failed to develop mechanisms for
preventing infringing conduct.137 In addition, the Court found that the high
volume of advertisements directly correlated to acts of direct infringement,
indicating an intent to promote such uses by both Grokster and StreamCast.138
The rule of inducement also requires a showing of actual infringement by
the users of the software.'39 The Court declared the record to be teeming with
evidence of innumerable instances of copyright infringement by Grokster's and
StreamCast's users.140 This, coupled with the finding of intentional conduct by
both Grokster and StreamCast, was sufficient for MGM to withstand a motion
for summary judgment.4 1
In so holding, the majority rejected the Ninth Circuit's application of the
Supreme Court's holding in Sony Cop. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc.142
Unlike Sony's production of the VCR, the actions of both Grokster and
StreamCast went beyond merely distributing a product capable of infringing
uses.143 Rather, both companies intentionally encouraged and profited from the
direct infringement of their users.144 In the end, "[i]f liability for inducing
infringement is ultimately found, it will not be on the basis of presuming or
imputing fault, but from inferring a patently illegal objective from statements
and actions showing what that objection was."145
2. Grokster's Impact on Secondary jability.
a. Impact on Vicarious Liability. While the Supreme Court premised its
decision in Grokster upon contributory liability, the decision still has
ramifications on vicarious liability.146 Notably, the Supreme Court cited the
vicarious liability test for copyright infringement promulgated by the Second
Circuit in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L Green Co.147  This test sets forth a
standard for the financial benefit requirement that requires a more direct
136 Id. at 937.
137 Id at 939.
38 Id at 940.
139 Id
140 Id at 940-41.
141 Id
142 Id at 941.
143 Id
144 Id.
145 Id
146 William Sloan Coats et al., Pre- and Post-Grokster Copynight Infringement Liabiliiy for Secondary and
Terday Parties, 842 PL/PAT 221, 245 (2005); Bartholomew, supra note 95, at 463.
147 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930.
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connection than that previously demanded by the Ninth Circuit.148 As a result,
many lower courts could interpret the Supreme Court's dicta in Grokster as an
affirmative endorsement of the Second Circuit's test for vicarious liability and
thereby insist upon a more substantial showing of a direct financial benefit as
opposed to the more attenuated prerequisite called for by the Ninth Circuit.149
The subsequent application of the stricter standard can readily be seen in
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CDZ, Inc., where the District Court for the Central
District of Illinois applied the test set forth by the Supreme Court in Grokster.s0
The widespread adoption of the stricter standard could result in the possible
decline of copyright infringement claims predicated upon the theory of
vicarious liability, especially in those instances where the plaintiffs have
evidence of an intent to cause the infringement on behalf of a third party.'5
The philosophical underpinnings of the Supreme Court's decision could also
impact the application of vicarious copyright infringement.152 In Grokster, the
Court indicated that the imposition of liability upon both Grokster and
StreamCast was appropriate because of "the impossibility of enforcing rights in
the copyrighted works against the millions of direct infringers who used
Grokster." 53  Under this principle, the doctrine of vicarious liability for
copyright infringement is a form of risk allocation.154  The owners and
operators of performance venues are generally in a far better position to incur
the financial penalties resulting from copyright infringement. 55 The copyright
holder's chance for receiving adequate retribution is thus maximized by holding
the employer or venue owner vicariously liable for the direct infringement.5 6
Importantly, the Supreme Court's decision in Grokster may have called into
question the continued existence of vicarious liability within the world of
copyright infringement. 57  Vicarious liability had historically been widely
employed because plaintiffs were not required to prove knowledge on behalf of
148 Coats et al., supra note 146, at 245.
149 Id
150 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CDZ, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 930, 935 (C.D. Ill. 2010).
151 Coats et al., supra note 146, at 245.
152 Bartholomew, supra note 95, at 461.
153 Id
154 6 PATRY, supra note 52, § 21:62.
155 Douglas Litchtman & William Landes, Indirect Liabiky for Copyright Infringement: An Economic
Perspective, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395, 398-99 (2003) (explaining that because employers enjoy
both control and benefits of infringement they are better able to compensate injured copyright
holders).
156 Id. at 398.
157 Robert M. Hirning, ContributoU and Vicarious Copyright Infringement in Computer Software:
Harming One Form of Intellectual Propery by Protecting Another, 6 CHI.-KENT). INTELL. PROP. 10, 18-
19 (2006).
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the secondary infringer.158 Following Grokster, some lower courts combined the
doctrines of vicarious liability and contributory infringement into one single
doctrine of secondary liability.159 This is particularly worrisome because it is
now possible to impose contributory liability upon a showing of intent to
induce or cause infringement absent knowledge of specific acts of
infringement. 60 It is therefore becoming increasingly unnecessary for plaintiffs
to plead vicarious liability for copyright infringement when the freshly
broadened theory of contributory infringement can fully address the alleged
infringement scenario.'6'
b. Impact on Contributoy Infringement. The most far-reaching and important
implications of the Grokster decision have been on the doctrine of contributory
liability. Unfortunately, the decision has left the field just as muddled and
confusing as before, if not more so. Since the 2005 decision, some courts have
read the knowledge requirement as requiring a showing of reasonable
knowledge.162 A few courts have taken the expanded notion of the knowledge
requirement even further, stating that mere notice is sufficient to satisfy the
scienter requirement.163 The District Court for the District of Columbia is one
such court?" In Newborn v. Yahoo!, Inc., the court held that the knowledge
prong of the analysis could be satisfied by demonstrating that the defendant had
been notified of specific infringing acts and either failed to take steps to stop
the infringing conduct or engaged in willful blindness concerning the possible
infringement.165 Other jurisdictions have continued to apply the Ninth Circuit
standard requiring knowledge of specific acts of infringement.166  These
jurisdictional variations in the scienter requirement demonstrate that fault is
becoming the primary inquiry in the legal analysis of third-party copyright
infringement, just as the Supreme Court intended. 67
Flexibility is also evident in the variation between the courts' analyses of the
material contribution prong.' 68 Some courts have imposed liability for
158 Id.
159 Bartholomew, supra note 95, at 461.
160 Hirning, supra note 157, at 19.
161 Id.
162 Bartholomew, upra note 95, at 455.
163 Id. at 455-56.
'6 6 PATRY, supra note 52, § 21:47, n.23.
165 Newborn v. Yahoo!, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 2d 181, 186 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Monotype
Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 877, 886 (N.D. Ill. 2005)).
166 Bartholomew, supra note 95, at 455.
167 Alfred C. Yen, Third-Pary Copyngbt Ijabili After Grokster, 91 MINN. L. REV. 184, 227-28
(2006).
168 Bartholomew, supra note 95, at 457.
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indirectly facilitating the infringing acts. 169 For example, the Ninth Circuit has
found material contribution in cases where the defendant could have " 'take[n]
simple measures to prevent further damage' to copyrighted works, yet
continue[d] to provide access to infringing works." 70 In Perfect 10, Inc. v.
AmaZon, Inc., Perfect 10, a company that markets, copyrights, and sells pictures
of naked models, operated a website containing these images which required a
subscription for access.17' While Google's image search feature did not include
the images requiring a subscription, it did include those copies of the images
that individuals uploaded to the internet without authorization from
Perfect 10.172 Perfect 10 sued Google, alleging, among other claims,
contributory infringement. 7 3 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the
district court for a determination of whether Google materially contributed to
the directly infringing conduct by providing access to infringing images because
it was not clear from the record whether Google could have taken steps to
feasibly prevent the infringing conduct.174
Furthermore, Ama.on.com set forth three factors that justified the imposition
of liability for contributory infringement, especially when the material
contribution prong is satisfied by demonstrating that the defendant could have
taken reasonable steps to prevent the infringement. The three factors are: "(1)
the difficulty or cost of taking a precaution against infringement; (2) the
effectiveness of the precaution -- i.e. the amount of infringement the precaution
prevents; and (3) the amount of non- infringing behavior simultaneously
supported by the defendant." 75 The first factor prevents defendants from
having to enact measures that are unduly burdensome to them in order to
escape liability. 7 6 In other words, if the measures necessary to impede
infringement are excessively expensive or unrealistic, the defendant will not be
punished for his inability to take such steps. The second factor is fairly straight
forward: the more effective the precaution at preventing copyright
infringement, the more favored it will be within the judicial system. 77 The third
factor is more complex. Essentially, the likelihood that the defendant is culpable
is proportional to the infringing nature of the conduct to which he
169 Id
170 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).
171 Id. at 1157.
172 Id
'73 Id
174 Id. at 1172-73.
1s Alfred C. Yen, Torts and the Construction of Inducement and Contributoy Liability in AmaZon and
Visa, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTs 513, 522 (2009).
176 Id.
177 Id
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contributes.17 8 The greater the likelihood that the defendant is contributing to
the activity because of the activity's non-infringing uses, the greater the
justification for his support of the infringing activity.'79
Other factual situations have led courts to base a finding of liability upon a
more direct connection regarding the material contribution. 180 In Perfect 10, Inc.
v. Visa International Service Ass'n, the Ninth Circuit demanded a stronger showing
of material contribution for the imposition of liability than it previously
articulated in Ama.Zon.181 In the Visa case, Perfect 10 sued Visa for processing
credit card transactions to websites that directly infringed upon their
copyrights.182 The court found that "[t]he credit card companies cannot be said
to [have] materially contribute[d] to the infringement in this case because they
[had] no direct connection to that infringement."' 83 The court based its finding
on the fact that Visa did not contribute to the reproduction, alteration, display,
or distribution of the infringing material; rather, they merely provided a
mechanism that allowed the direct infringers to profit.'8 It should be noted
that this formulation of the material contribution requirement is not
inconsistent with that set forth by the same circuit in Perfect 10 Inc., v. Ama.on,
Inc.185 In that case, Google clearly displayed infringing material, thus materially
contributing to the direct infringement. However, the difference between the
cases seems to be that the situation faced by Visa demanded a more substantial
showing of material contribution than that set forth in AmaZon.
B. RAMIFICATIONS FOR INFRINGEMENT DURING LIVE PERFORMANCES
At first blush, it may seem that Grokster has little applicability outside the
context of copyright infringement stemming from the use of technological
innovations such as the internet. While it is true that some of the rules handed
down in the post-Grokster era are limited to technological advancements, some
of the rules could have an impact upon the more traditional areas of copyright
infringement, such as live musical performances.
1. Vicarious Liability. The Grokster decision could be interpreted as
prohibiting the imposition of vicarious liability even where the defendant has
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 See Bartholomew, supra note 95, at 458 (arguing courts denied contributory copyright liability
because the contract between the defendant and the direct infringer was too indirect).
181 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).
182 Id. at 792.
183 Id. at 796.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 801.
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satisfied the direct control prong of the vicarious liability test.186 Thus, if the
owner or operator "takes reasonable precaution against the probability of harm
to the plaintiff," he will not be found liable for secondary copyright
infringement. 8 7 The owner or operator of a music venue can evade liability if
he exercises control but ultimately fails to prevent the infringing conduct.188
Applying this concept to the fact pattern set forth in Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CDZ, Inc., the owners and operators of Goodfellas could evade liability if they
are able to demonstrate that they took "reasonable steps" to prevent the local
musical artists from engaging in copyright infringement, even if they were not
successful and the artists still performed copyrighted material.
On the other hand, the aforementioned philosophical underpinnings of the
Grokster decision could militate in favor of the imposition of vicarious liability in
many situations involving the live performance of music. The theory of risk
allocation is particularly attractive in contexts such as Broadcast Music, Inc. P.
CDZ, Inc.189  It is far easier and more cost-effective for the copyright holder to
sue the owner or operator of the music venue rather than each individual
performer for the violation of a copyright.190 Furthermore, given the nomadic
nature of many musicians and performers, it would be difficult for victims of
infringement to locate those performers directly responsible for violating their
copyrights in order to serve them with process.'19 In light of this economic
viewpoint, the owners and operators of the music venues are in the best
position to address the harms resulting from copyright infringement, whether
or not they intended such infringement to occur. The interests of those
affected by copyright infringement are thus more adequately served by placing
the blame on individuals who are arguably responsible and also financially
prepared to deal with the aftermath.
2. Contributory Liability. The impact of contributory liability on copyright
infringement resulting from live musical performances is more difficult to
ascertain. The vast majority of post-Grokster case law deals with infringement in
the internet context; therefore, its application to the performance of live music
appears tenuous. However, the principles articulated in cases following the
implementation of Grokster, particularly those arising out of the Ninth Circuit,
may have a wide range of applicability.
186 Yen, supra note 167, at 228-29.
187 Id
188 Id
189 See Litchman & Landes, supra note 155, at 398-99.
1 Id at 399.
191 Id
194 [Vol. 19:173
22
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol19/iss1/7
GROKSTER AND BEYOND
Initially, the doctrine of vicarious liability was far more attractive to plaintiffs
pleading infringement by musical performers.192 This could be explained by the
fact that vicarious liability is essentially a form of strict liability.193 Thus,
plaintiffs who pled vicarious liability were not required to prove knowledge on
the part of the defendant regarding the infringing acts.194 The post-Gmkster line
of cases appears to have loosened the scienter requirements traditionally
associated with contributory liability, making this doctrine far more appealing to
plaintiffs. The expansion of the knowledge requirement to encompass notice
of the specific infringing acts set forth in Newborn v. Yahoo! Inc. is arguably
applicable to infringement that results from performances of live music.
The rule stated in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CDZ, Inc., could also apply in the
live performance context. In that case, BMI sent the defendants numerous
letters between March 8, 2004 and April 16, 2009 informing them that they
needed a license to allow performances of copyrighted material in their
restaurant.'95 BMI also sent representatives to Goodfellas on three separate
occasions where they observed specific instances of infringement that they
reported to defendants.196 This is a clear example of a defendant receiving
notice of specific instances of infringing conduct. Under the rule articulated in
Newborn, the owners and operators of Goodfellas would satisfy the knowledge
requirement of contributory liability, despite lacking actual knowledge of
specific infringing acts as originally required for liability prior to Grokster.
The newer interpretations of the material contribution requirement also
provide increased opportunities for plaintiffs to successfully plead contributory
infringement in this type of situation. The indirect connection found to satisfy
the material contribution prong in Perfect 10, Inc. v. AmaZon, Inc. is readily
applicable to the live music context. To satisfy the material contribution
requirement, the defendant merely has to have been in the position to take
simple steps to prevent subsequent infringement but failed to do so.1 97 The
owners and operators of Goodfellas, in addition to other owners and operators
of small music venues, conceivably could have taken a simple step, such as
looking over the artists' set lists prior to their performances, in order to evade
192 See Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929)
(imposing liability on dance hall operators for the infringing conduct of an orchestra); Gershwin
Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (2d Cit. 1971) (holding a
concert organizer vicariously liable for the infringement by artists performing at the concert).
193 See Yen, supra note 167, at 227-28.
194 Id. at 228.
19s Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CDZ, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 930, 932-33 (C.D. Ill. 2010).
196 Id. at 933.
197 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Religious
Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1995)).
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liability. However, without evidence of such actions, the owners could face
liability for contributory infringement under this formulation.
Furthermore, if the court accepts the factual analysis described by Yen, the
contributions of defendants such as those in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CDZ, Inc.
could be found somewhat justifiable, especially in light of the third factor-the
non-infringing nature of the defendant's activity in comparison to its infringing
nature.198 Under this balancing test, it could be entirely reasonable for owners
and operators of music venues to provide the opportunity for copyright
infringement, despite potentially knowing that it is occurring, if their primary
purpose is to bring in customers for activities unrelated to the infringement,
such as purchasing food and beverages.
The stricter interpretation of the material contribution prong embraced by
the Ninth Circuit can also find its place within more traditional areas of
copyright infringement. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa International Senice Ass'n indicated
that evidence of a contribution to the reproduction, alteration, display, or
distribution of infringing material was necessary for a finding of material
contribution. This articulation of material contribution is easily satisfied in the
music venue context. One could easily argue that the owners and operators of
music venues such as Goodfellas Pub contribute to the reproduction of
infringing musical works by providing the performers access to a venue, sound
equipment, and perhaps most importantly, an audience.
C. AN AGE-OLD SOLUTION
Obviously, it is still not clear what conduct on behalf of a live music venue
constitutes secondary liability for copyright infringement. The best solution for
the owners and operators of these venues is to be proactive and obtain a license
for the performance of musical compositions.
1. Music Licensing Agreements. There are three performing rights associations:
the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP),
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), and the Society of European Stage, Authors and
Composers (SESAC).199 The songwriter or publisher grants the performing
rights society the nonexclusive right to license the nondramatic performance of
his works.200 A nondramatic performance is a performance of a piece of music
that is not part of an identifiable plot.201 The performing rights society then
grants licenses to entities such as radio broadcasters, television broadcasters,
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concert halls, hotels, night dubs, and public arenas.202 The society collects fees
for these licenses and distributes the appropriate shares of these fees to the
songwriters or publishers. 203
The primary form of licensing employed by the performing rights societies
is the blanket license. Entities are able to pay an annual fee for the ability to
play any of the compositions within the performing rights society's expansive
catalogue of music. 2 0 The fee a music venue is required to pay in exchange for
this right, if music is performed in the venue on a regular basis, is usually based
on several factors, including- "the seating capacity of the venue, whether there is
an admission charge, the amount of the admission charge, the weekly music
budget for live performances, and the number of hours per week musical
entertainment is provided to a paying audience." 205 If, on the other hand, music
is played at the location rarely or irregularly, then the performing rights society
may collect fees from the promoter or producer.206
The agreement to license a songwriter or publisher's musical compositions
also includes a right to enforce the copyright.207 The performing rights society
is given the right to litigate any infringement claims and to collect any damages
resulting from such litigation.208 This explains why BMI has standing as the
plaintiff in the case at issue here, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CDZ Inc., rather than the
individual writers of the popular songs infringed upon by the performers. In
addition to the right to initiate copyright infringement litigation, the performing
rights society generally also possesses the right to join in any lawsuits
commenced by the songwriter or publisher and in any lawsuits commenced
against the songwriter or publisher.209
These licensing agreements serve as insurance policies of sorts-they
protect against acts of infringement by musical performers by allowing the
owners and operators of live music venues to pay a relatively small annual fee
for the right to have any songs they wish performed. This seems like quite an
attractive solution and is perhaps the wisest choice for the owners and
operators of live music venues. However, the licensing agreements'
monopolistic nature has been called into question by some.2 10 In Bmadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasing Systems, Inc., Columbia Broadcasting Systems
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203 Id. at 127-28.
204 KOHN & KOHN, supra note 201, at 878.
205 MULLER, supra note 199, at 130.
206 Id
207 Id
208 Id. at 132.
209 Id. at 132-33.
210 See Raines, supra note 10, at 182.
1972011]
25
Holt: Grokster and Beyond: Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringeme
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2011
J. INTELL PROP. L
(CBS) sued BMI and ASCAP, claiming that their blanket licensing scheme
constituted price fixing, a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.211 The Court
rejected CBS's claim, finding that "in the face of available alternatives including
direct negotiation with individual copyright owners, the blanket license has
provided an acceptable mechanism for at least a large part of the market for the
performing rights to copyrighted musical compositions." 212 The seemingly
boundless amount of power wielded by the performing rights societies in regard
to granting licenses is not without its limitations. Both BMI and ASCAP signed
decrees which restricted their practices. 213 The "Amended Final Judgment," the
decree signed by ASCAP, requires that the organization (1) give a license to
anyone who wants one as long as they agree to pay a reasonable fee; (2) does
"not discriminate against similarly situated users"; and (3) in the event that the
individual requesting the license and ASCAP cannot come to an agreement
concerning the reasonable fee, ASCAP will consent to whatever fee the District
Court for the Southern District of New York deems reasonable.214 The decree
signed by BMI differs from the ASCAP decree in that it does not provide a
mechanism for judicial intervention when the parties cannot agree upon a
reasonable fee. 215 Thus, the owners and operators of live music venues are not
left at the mercy of the giant performance rights organizations.
2. The Lounge Act Agreement. If the music venue is one that infrequently
engages artists to perform live music or if they do not wish to go through one
of the performing rights organizations, another alternative is available. A
lounge act agreement is a contract between the musical artist and the venue that
sets out the terms of the performance. 216 A lounge act agreement contains a
number of provisions, several of which are especially pertinent to the avoidance
of secondary liability for copyright infringement. First, the agreement often
contains a questionable material provision, which requires the performer to
submit whatever he plans to perform for approval, in order to screen the
material for questionable, offensive, or obscene content.217 While perhaps not
its primary purpose, the provision could satisfy the reasonable step requirement
set forth in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Ama.Zon, thereby alleviating the venue of the
potential imposition of contributory liability.
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Second, the music venue could insert a provision that requires the artist to
only perform original material.218  Under this provision, the artist would be
prohibited from performing any work that is not original and belonging solely
to the artist.219 The artist would also agree not to "infringe on the rights of any
other person or third party, including rights of publicity, privacy, and
copyright." 220 Any violation of this provision would constitute a breach of
contract, and in the event of a copyright infringement suit initiated by one of
the performing rights societies, the music venue would be able to sue the artist
to recoup its losses for any liability caused by their direct infringement. 221 The
music venue could also insert an indemnification provision that would render
the artist rather than the venue responsible for any legal issues arising from any
claims commenced against the venue resulting from breaches of the agreement
by the artist.222
Finally, the lounge act agreement could contain language that expressly
states that the performer is an independent contractor.223 This means that the
artist is not an employee of the venue and that the artist does not have any
other traditional business relationship with the venue.224 Thus, the venue would
be generally relieved of all legal responsibilities for the artist's actions if such an
agreement were used.225
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Grokster did little to clear the muddied
waters surrounding secondary liability in the world of copyright infringement.
Different versions of the two concepts still abound from circuit to circuit
regarding the various elements of both vicarious and contributory liability,
leaving those outside of the legal community more confused than ever. Clearly,
the emphasis has shifted from an imposition of strict liability to favoring fault-
based liability. Application of the post-Grokster rules imposing fault
requirements upon the owners and operators of live music venues has the
potential to prevent the inequitable infliction of liability upon innocent
individuals for the conduct of autonomous musical groups. However, the shift
to fault-based theories of liability has also resulted in the expansion of the
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knowledge requirement under contributory liability, meaning more owners and
operators could now be subject to contributory liability as compared to the pre-
Grokster era.
The post-Grokster decisions also indicate that the owners and operators of
live music venues could be liable for a wide range of conduct, from seemingly
tenuous connections to direct infringement to clear-cut instances of
contribution. While the expansive spectrum of material contribution appears to
shed little light on the level of conduct sufficient to preclude liability, the new
rules indicate there are steps that an individual could take to evade the
imposition of either vicarious or contributory infringement liability.
Ultimately, the only thing that is perfectly clear is that, because of the
distinct lack of clarity that exists in this area of the law, it is wise for live music
venues to be proactive and protect themselves. This can be accomplished
through obtaining a license from one of the performing rights organizations or
through entering into a contractual agreement with the actual performer in an
attempt to allocate liability to the party actually responsible for the potential
copyright infringement. Perhaps the rules promulgated in the post-Grokster era
will restore an element of fairness to the imposition of liability for copyright
infringement by punishing those truly responsible. Perhaps nothing will change
at all. But, it is possible that the post-Grokster rules regarding secondary liability
could find a niche within the more traditional areas of copyright infringement.
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